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The Economic Recovery of Havana (III) 
by Jorge Salazar Carrillo 
The author tells the methods and strategies needed towards reconstructing 
the Cuban economy after a transition process towards democracy and the 
rule of law. The first part of this article was published in Herencia, Vol. 
18.1, March, 2012, in the section 'Cuba, the Possible Country', and Part II in 
Vol. 22.2, in August, 2016 
El autor incide en las medidas y estrategias que considera necesarias para la 
reconstrucci6n de la economia cubana tras un proceso de transici6n hacia la 
democracia y el Estado de Derecho. La primera parte de este articulo Jue 
publicada en Herencia, Vol. 18.1, marzo de 2012, en la secci6n 'Cuba, el 
pais posible ', y la segunda parte en el Vol. 22.2, de agosto de 2016 
2. Stabilize and Expand Short-Run Production 
Without new investments, it will be necessary to keep whatever existing 
production remains at the time of transition, not only in a recovery and 
ongoing mode, but expanding in the countryside. While the quagmire of titles 
in rural areas is settled, farmers should be allowed occupy land from the 
state-owned farms and cooperatives, to establish production activities in 
small plots for their own self subsistence, and for distribution to the broader 
markets. These parcels of land should be small, but minifunda should be 
avoided, and credit should be provided by the Banco Popular de Ahorro, 
appropriately renamed Banco de F omento Agricola e Industrial de Cuba 
(BANFAIC), a noted first-rate institution founded during the democratic era 
of the early 1950s. The objective would be to avoid the consequences of 
famine in the island 1• 
The same framework should inform industrial and services production, in 
terms of providing the credit necessary for activities to continue, and if 
possible, expand, although the prospects for the latter would probably be dim. 
Of course, the firms in question would not be amenable for subdivision such 
as the primary activity just considered, thus continuing their operations as 
before. Loans would be forthcoming through the BANF AIC. 
These measures will partially alleviate the scarcity of available goods and 
services at transition time and would constitute a dovetailing of emergency 
measures under Section 1. The city of Havana, and its hinterland in the wider 
province, should constitute the bulwarks of this recovery strategy, that should 
extend west and east across Cuba, and the success of which, would 
reinvigorate the recovery of the capital city. 
Investment will have to increase from a dismal negative net rate (new 
investment being below amortization and depreciation) presently, but that 
would come mostly from abroad. In addition to international -organizations 
and governments mentioned in the first section of this essay, private investors 
will be keenly interested in a reemerging Cuba, and many of them will be 
Cuban-Americans. Apart from the public loans just specified, private capital 
will contribute to stabilize and, hopefully, bolster production throughout the 
economy of Cuba. Most of this effort should be addressed to the bolstering of 
goods and service for internal demand, but some should be directed to the 
foreign markets of Cuban products. It has been argued in another book that 
exports from the island will experience substantial growth at most within 3 to 
5 years of economic liberation, and in some cases, like tourism, immediately. 
Havana will be at the center of those increases2 . 
One controversial item, strictly tied to investment from abroad, would be the 
privatization of businesses in the island. During transition, this activity 
should be limited only to those properties that could not be entangled in 
claims expected from expropriated owners, which should be addressed by an 
elected government under a new constitution replacing the last one approved 
by the communist government in 1992. However, property, strictly owned by 
the previous government of Cuba, should be privatized in order to finance 
public services without imposing a tax burden that would be unbearable for 
the population. An example of this alternative are the eight sugar mills built 
in the totalitarian period with financing and technical assistance from the 
Soviet Union. The advantage of early privatization would be to bolster 
production during the transition period, in addition to the fiscal benefits 
already mentioned. The former is an essential piece in the dismantling of an 
exploitative system in which the Cuban people were living from hand to 
mouth through meager coupon rations, while suffering high payroll (hidden) 
and consumption taxes. 
In addition to the measures just discussed, it is expected that previous owners 
and present users of productive property will voluntarily strike some 
bargains, in the manner described in the literature of external economies and 
diseconomies. Agreements between these parties may give rise to sharing 
between past and actual holders of the properties, that would be mutually 
beneficial to both, and would result in improvements in their conditions, and 
increased output thereafter. It is expected that such endeavors will 
particularly be important with regard to rural production. 
3. Encourage Free Enterprise 
Even now the largest share of goods and services produced in the Cuban 
economy is supplied by those feeding the black and grey (meaning partly 
legal) markets. The state owns well in excess of 90 percent of all national 
productive property, yet most of its output is addressed to foreign demand, 
principally exports and the serving of the tourist business, which to a large 
extent is undertaken within Cuba, but in clearly defined enclaves. The small 
share of its productive capacity effectively serving the needs of the internal 
market is overwhelmed by the supply coming from the partial or total 
underground economic activities, in addition to the dwindling numbers of 
very small private businesses which constitute the informal economy. 
Obviously the underground (black and gray markets) and informal economies 
are hampered by measures spanning from stark prohibitions to restrictive 
regulations which suppress their potential. Lifting them would constitute 
probably the most effective way of increasing the production and trading of 
goods and services across the board, as it would allow the market to incite 
production and trade in all sectors. The city of Havana will be at the center of 
such expansions if the past is any indication, and it is believed this will be so. 
When a totalitarian Castro regime feigned an opening about 15 years ago, 
more than 250,000 new small businesses were registered, concentrated in the 
capital city. This pulled much production into this largest Cuban market, 
which at the time was the gravitational point of tourist activities, later 
deemphasized there. It is expected that in a matter of months small 
enterprises will double their ranks, from the presently dwindling number of 
own account producers (cuentapropistas) , which are now about 125,000. 
In order to support the expected growth in small business, new infrastructure 
will have to come along, and much of it will be put in place in the hub of the 
country: Havana. Of course, under the watchful eye, for the gaps and 
bottlenecks that may emerge in a transitional government. Transportation and 
communication are the venues for micro business; they need to spread the 
information among potential traders, while the goods have to be delivered 
and received. The freeing of the internet and the breakup of media monopoly 
will be essential for the markets to perform their wonders and vanquish 
scarcity, as much as the multiplication of buyers and sellers. But again, the 
key to economic movement would be haulage at the ports and airports. 
Credit will have to be provided for many of the small firms, and that again 
should be organized using a window of the BANF AIC, which in 1959 was 
already offering micro finance, which has recently become so popular and in 
vogue. Providing the grease that would make the moving parts of micro 
enterprises accelerate the economy forward, it would represent an essential 
component of the recovery that is envisaged. Although lending branches 
should be spread along the island, the central mechanism will reside in the 
city of Havana, with the private sector involved as well. Private banks and 
micro-finance enterprises are not allowed in Cuba presently. This will be one 
of the first measures to be undone in the island, as the providing of micro, 
small and medium-sized loans provides the wherewithal to undertake the 
essential buying and selling that would constitute the basic ingredients 
feeding the establishment of free markets. It must not be lost in the fray that 
small and medium-sized firms not only address private consumer and 
government demands, but also purchases substantially from one another. 
With regards to financing, one caveat should be kept in mind: the 
proliferation of banks that took place after the demise of communism in the 
Soviet Bloc should be avoided. The recreated central bank of Cuba, the 
Banco Nacional, should establish strict regulatory requirements for the 
creation of banks and other credit institutions, and should strictly supervise 
the conduct of their affairs, as customary in Western nations. 
The final step necessary for freeing private economic activity is the support 
of markets. These were a success whenever they were left to operate under 
the invisible hands of demand and supply, even in communist Cuba. Again, 
like in credit, the restoration of the central Havana markets, so dilapidated at 
the present time, should be the starting point of the spread of these facilities 
into the countryside. The major demand of the island's economy will continue 
to be unfurled in the markets of its central city, where over 20 percent of the 
population resides, and is the seat of the government and the financial capital 
of the nation. Apart from the central markets, the infrastructure of distribution 
within the central city into its barrios, spreading throughout the rest of the 
country, will ensure success for freedom of enterprise 
4. Fiscal Reform 
One of the most egregious backward steps of the most recalcitrant Soviet 
communism, unfortunately still existing in Cuba, is the callousness of its tax 
oppression. Taxation in this system is hidden. Most of it is discounted from 
wages and salaries at the source, without any recognition of even a rate of 
taxation. This means that every recipient of an emolument of any kind from 
the government is secretly taxed. This must give way to a transparent system 
in which, in principle, both employee and employer must contribute. It is 
proposed that a flat-rate tax system be instituted, with different grades 
depending on the level of income (but at most three). The system will be 
administered by the Ministry of Finance, which will lose the additional title 
of Prices, the latter term giving away the fact that, unknowingly, the Cuban 
population is charged a hidden tax in any of the prices they pay, given that 
the government is practically the sole purveyor of goods and services in the 
economy. 
Another aspect that must be changed is the hidden taxation of profits 
obtained by the communist firms (practically all), that inefficiently provide 
the goods and services that are interchanged in the country. Presently, the 
government absorbs both the apparent profits and losses (more common) of 
government enterprises. Thus, there is no demarcation between the finance 
ministry and socialist enterprises. Therefore, no incentives are given for 
increasing revenues and reducing costs, since the communist government will 
reap all of this benefit. On the other hand, who would care about losses if the 
public sector will ultimately absorb them? In this case, a strict and relatively 
low flat tax has to be charged, with no gradations. 
Finally, the turnover tax that is typical of communist countries, in which sales 
are taxed at every 1 evel ( although in Cuba these have been disguised), 
resulting in an ever greater cascade as goods and services approach the 
ultimate consumer, has to be replaced by the modern value-added tax (VAT) 
concept. This burdens only that part of output that is not contributed by input 
from other sectors, basically what is paid to the factors of production. As a 
result each output and sale is taxed only once. A VAT tax of around 15 
percent would appear reasonable at that juncture3. 
These taxes, together with the proceeds of the limited privatization that 
would take place during the transition, should ensure a balanced budget, 
something that has not happened in Cuba since 1959. It should be 
remembered that by mid- to late 60' s the Banco Nacional de Cuba was 
stripped of the traditional responsibilities of central banking, and was strictly 
devoted to the function of fiscal agent of the Cuban treasury. That meant 
financing the voluminous deficit of the communist government. Thus, the 
repressed inflation has since existed on the island has had a combined fiscal-
monetary origin. Clearly the initial measures of the transition must decouple 
one institution from the other. All these reforms, which are conducive to a 
low burden of production and consumption, will have the city of Havana as 
its main stage, given that the Ministry of Finance Gettisoning the insulting 
epithet of prices) and the Banco Central de Cuba, with its name reverting to 
its original, Banco Nacional de Cuba, have been always in residence in the 
capital. Of course, this would not be to the detriment of provinces and 
municipalities, which being the urban areas around which essential primary 
production would be reorganized, will necessitate a strengthening of the 
diminished presence that they have had during the communist period. 
Finally, the most momentous fiscal measure to be initiated during the 
transition will be to face the social security crisis resulting from an aging 
population that is not explicitly covered by any explicit mechanism. 
Presently, pensions for practically all workers in Cuba are directly paid out of 
the national budget. The reestablishment of the Social Security Bank created 
in 1959 and later dismantled, would be a first step in tackling this most 
serious problem, in a country soon to have more than 20 percent of its 
population at, or above 60 years of age (retirement age is now being raised to 
65). At this juncture, with the standard of living in the island being one of 
very extreme poverty, the state will have to confront the provision of cost-of-
living pensions, as any consideration of privatizing the system is a question 
for the medium-term future. 
The onus of this responsibility by the Cuban state will somewhat be 
alleviated by the dismantling of the system of rationing of goods and 
services, which is dependent on heavy budgetary subsidies in order to keep 
their prices artificially low (to which we may add, discourage their above-
board production by the private sector, and foster black markets). 
5. Financial Reform 
Cuba has been hovering for decades between a foreign exchange system 
based in the duality of an artificial and arbitrary Cuban peso used for foreign 
transactions (the CUC or chavito), and the run-of-the -mill Cuban peso used 
for internal transactions. The former has, over the years, been given a 
symbolic value superior to that of the strong-hard currencies of the world, 
basically the dollar (which represents 90 percent of all foreign currency 
transactions), copying a chapter from the Soviet Union's convertible rubles. 
In contrast, the circulating currency issued by the monetary authority of the 
day, has had a shadow price at the other extreme, being heavily discounted 
against hard currencies (again, usually the American dollar), even in the state 
run Casas de Cambio (exchange houses). This multiple system completely 
distorts production, trade and consumption in the island, and must be 
replaced by a unified one. 
But what should be the value of the new Cuban peso after a monetary reform 
is undertaken at the beginning of the transition? It should reflect its history of 
strong international purchasing power. Thus, the main foreign exchange 
activity which would take place in the capital, under a restored Bolsa de La 
Habana, should define parity with the dollar. Like the Europeans after World 
War II, the value of the currency should adapt itself to the very large needs 
for imports; and this is why these countries established overvalued exchange 
rates at that juncture, backed by the Marshall Plan. It is our belief that Cuba 
would have similar support, at least $10 billion in contributions from the 
multilateral financial institutions and the members of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development, to insure reserve backing for dollar 
parity that its central bank would establish. Of course, a return to the 
institution established in 1948, the Banco Nacional de Cuba, should be 
pursued as well. 
The latter institution will be strongly centered in Havana, as it was fifty years 
ago, although it would have branches across the island. It would be in charge 
of foreign exchange transactions, implying the elimination of the Casas de 
Cambio, but its main role would involve the assurance that the reserves 
donated to Cuba at the beginning of its reconstruction are safeguarded, 
mostly as a backing to its currency. Of course, foreign exchange transactions 
will be decentralized, and conducted freely by the banking system that the 
Banco will inspect and supervise. The monetary reform that it will conduct, 
will not only establish a new currency, but will allow an orderly 
establishment of private banking in Cuba, both domestic and foreign, 
ensuring that the newly created banks conform to the capital requirements 
expressed by the Bank of International Settlements in its Basel II Agreement. 
The Banco Nacional de Cuba will conduct monetary policy in the island as an 
independent institution devoid of political control from the executive branch, 
other than the naming of its authorities, with the approval of the legislative 
branch. Apart from ensuring the strength of the Cuban banking and financial 
systems, the central bank will be in charge of containing price inflation in the 
economy (as measured by a sophisticated consumer price index) to a 
reasonably moderate range. It would not be in charge of counter-cyclical or 
growth policies, which should be the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance. But perhaps the central role of the Cuban economic recovery would 
lie under the tutelage of the also resurrected BANF AIC, which was 
established in 1950 and later dismantled by the Castro regime in 1960. It has 
already been mentioned that it must be involved in the crucial expansion of 
agricultural production during the transition, providing loans along the 
different phases of cultivation, harvesting, storage and distribution of these 
products. 
It should, like it did in the past, support the creation and operation of free 
farmers' cooperatives, for credit, production and services, and of course, 
support of the independent producers after the state farms, operating directly 
or indirectly, under the guise of different kinds of public cooperatives are 
dismantled. Yet not less important, though perhaps not as immediate, would 
be the recovery of industrial output in the island. Cuba would be ripe for 
recovering its old industrial base, well decentralized over its national 
territory, and which was sacrificed to the devil's curse of becoming a primary 
producer of sugar for the benefit of the Soviet Bloc, while internal production 
of the secondary sector was sacrificed at the altar of low-quality imports of 
manufactures from the communist countries. Further along, attention should 
be provided to export processing and free trade zones to manufacture 
products for the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which Cuba 
should quickly enjoin. To finance these objectives, the BANF AIC should 
float public bonds appropriately. 
6. Foreign Trade Opening 
Very few observers have commented on the total control which is applied to 
external trade in Cuba. Apart from the distorting dual exchange rate 
commented upon in the previous section, the island has kept a communist 
style planning of its foreign economic relations. This has also been inimical 
to the economy. The dismantling of the system has to begin with a drastic 
lowering of tariffs and the elimination of quotas. The latter are particularly 
tied to the fact that the government is the only authorized agency to bring 
goods into the country, through a dependency appropriately called Alimport. 
Exemptions to this rule are provided to foreign investors which participate in 
jointly-owned firms with the public sector (at most reaching 50 percent 
ownership), which imply duty-free importation, and are generally a source of 
corruption. The average level of import duties borders around 30 percent, and 
is among the highest in the world. 
Importing should be taken out of public hands, and allowed to respond to the 
needs of a free enterprise system, devoid of any kind of controls. It is well 
understood that for a few years imports would be well in excess of exports, 
given the dearth in the supply of goods presently characterizing the Cuban 
economy. The gap will be to some degree financed by foreign aid. The same 
approach should be applied to export, which up to the present, is a totally-
controlled government activity, only with exceptional dispensation in some 
large exporting sectors partially owned by foreign investors, like tobacco, 
citrus, nickel and tourism. Private enterprise is by far more apt to exploit 
international markets, and should be given free rein to do so. Since the parity 
of the dollar with the peso would be a disadvantage, it is essential to insure 
that raw material, intermediate and capital imports be given free entry, so that 
Cuba could become an entrepreneur for North America, as it is expected to 
enter NAFTA right away. It should be finally noted that the exportation of 
tourist services is expected to quickly contribute several additional billion 
dollars to gross foreign exchange receipts, contributing a good part of the 
financing of the country's import needs, obviously in excess of those needed 
for the tourists, which should also be partly served by a revived agricultural 
and manufacture production. 
It is clear that the port and airports of Havana would be the principal entry 
and exit points for the foreign trade of Cuba. The bottlenecks that they 
represent will be a challenge to its city planners. At this moment this port is 
an environrn~ntal eyesore and a limitation to any, but the minimal economic 
activity of present time scarcity. This bottleneck may give rise to an 
inflationary bout that would imperil future economic activity, and the pace of 
recovery. Even though the bulk of the population is concentrated in the 
capital and its province, the aspect discussed above will require a fuller use of 
the about a dozen other active ports in the Island, as well as its other 
international airports . 
Again, implied in all of the above is that the custom tariffs in Cuba should be 
kept at low nominal levels to facilitate the reconstruction of the island. The 
comparison to the post-war rebuilding in Europe beginning in 1945 has been 
used as an appropriate example. In the Cuban case it is even more apropos, 
since it is expected that export-processing zones, customs-free areas, 
assembly activities and all kinds of maquilas, would boost economic activity 
in the short-run. This requires a drawback of any import taxes, as well as 
exemptions from the value-added tax. Consistent with low import duties is 
the requirement to feed an undernourished and famished population, which in 
part would put pressure on imports, when not being able to be served by a 
revived internal production system. 
Apart from the hard currency provided by the exportation of tourist services, 
an economy with a small internal market, such as Cuba, would have to rely 
on foreign export markets to achieve a high rate of growth. Its nearness to the 
largest import market in the world, with which it had a long-standing 
relationship half a century ago, would recommend exploiting such an 
advantage to foster an open economy based on the exportation of primary and 
secondary goods for this market. For this, it is imperative to resurrect the 
ferries that brought Cuban exports of non-traditional products to the U.S., 
taking advantage of the identical gauge of the railways at both ends of the 
Florida Straits. Apart from sugar-based exports, to be dealt with in the 
next section, it should not escape anyone what the opening of the American 
cigar and rum markets would generate in terms of exportable production. 
7. Sugar Bio-refining 
Last but not least, what to do with Cuban sugar cane? It might be asked, what 
does that have to do with Havana, an area relatively weak in sugar cane. The 
answer is, as has been mentioned previously, the exchanges for everything, 
whether for sugar by-products, stocks, bonds, foreign currency or 
commodities, would be located around the Bolsa de La Habana, the almost 
one-hundred year old institution, which in the late teens of the last century 
boasted the leading financial depth per capita in the world. Like London has 
its City, where finance and business are king, so will Havana have its 
financial district, and the plans for the architectural recovery of the old Paris 
of the Americas must provide for it. 
But with regards to sugar cane properly, its consideration must begin with the 
central tenet that the plant is a source of energy that has always been 
competitive with foss il fuels. 
Early in the XXth century distilled ethanol, called carburante in Cuban 
folklore, was used as a hydrocarbon in the island, to propel its automobiles. 
The sugar mill generates electricity as well, which it uses in the process of 
milling, as well as to co-generate for outside buyers like the national electric 
grid. The manufacture of ethanol as a by-product has enormous implications 
for the sugar industry, that has been plagued over the years with world over-
capacity, and Cuba must face this challenge as early as possible. Not only for 
export to the voracious appetite of the American driver, but to make the norm 
the internal consumption by cars of the flex-fuel used by Brazilians vehicles. 
With regards to electricity, it should not be impossible to attain the goal of 
the sugar industry generating 10 percent of the electric capacity of the island. 
The concept of the sugar mill as a bio-refinery brings to mind the similar 
activity of taking crude hydrocarbons and refining them in an oil refinery, to 
obtain a certain number of derivatives. Although much research still awaits, it 
seems to be generally accepted that as long as the price of crude oil is above 
the floor of $50 per barrel, ethanol is competitive with gasoline, and should 
be mixed flexibly with it depending on their relative prices. However, there is 
a strategic consideration that must be added, and it is that the country 
consuming one quarter of the production of crude in the world (the U.S.), 
appears to have made a strategic decision that it will not trust its conventional 
suppliers, and will foster the use of ethanol. There would be no closer foreign 
supplies of ethanol than those of Cuba. 
Of course, the production and export of sugar itself should be another major 
objective of the bio-refinery. It is true that the path to regaining a foothold in 
the U.S. market would not be as promising as with ethanol. Nevertheless, the 
pessimists should take heart that the provisions of the World Trade 
Organization require that Cuba would be given some participation in this 
market. Certainly it would never be comparable to the advantageous position 
that the Castro totalitarian and communist dictatorship threw overboard, but 
several hundred thousand tons of sugar are within the realm of possibility. 
And, in the future, some agreement should be brokered with the American 
refiners, so that refining for the U.S.A. would be an added possibility of the 
Cuban sugar bio-refiners, together with myriad different grades of sugar, 
including organic ones. It should be remembered that in the early 1950's a 
deal of some sort with U.S. refineries was in the cards. 
Finally, the bio-refinery would produce other products with value added 
comparable to refining. It has already been remarked that the buying power 
of American consumers provides numerous opportunities, rum and spirits 
being among them. Other sugar bio-refined products are different types of 
alcohol, chemicals, molasses, pharmaceutical goods, animal feeds, paper, 
boards and wood. The determination of which should be emphasized involves 
a mathematical programming calculation that in the end private investors will 
have to make. But, bio-refineries will stand solidly in the middle of the 
economic recovery of Havana, Cuba. 
Author's Notes 
1- This applies as well to livestock, foresting and fishing production. 
2- See Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, "The Past, Present and Future of Cuban Trade", 
in Antonio Jorge and Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, eds. The Future Cuban 
Economy, University ofMiami, 2007. 
3- It should be noted that custom revenues from tariffs or import taxes should 
remain low at the beginning, given the famine- like scarcity of all kinds of 
goods that would certainly exist in Cuba at the time of transition. 
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